#Sandboxie osx Patch
#Sandboxie osx code
#Sandboxie osx windows 7

In Chromium, the renderers are always target processes, unless the -no-sandbox command line has been specified for the browser process.

#Sandboxie osx Patch

The job of the interceptions manager is to patch the Windows API calls that should be forwarded via IPC to the broker. The policy-allowed calls are then executed by the broker and the results returned to the target process via the same IPC. The sandbox IPC is a low-level mechanism (different from Chromium's IPC) that is used to transparently forward certain Windows API calls from the target to the broker: these calls are evaluated against the policy. The broker should always outlive all the target processes that it spawned.

Perform the policy-allowed actions on behalf of the target process.

Host the sandbox IPC service (to the target processes).

Specify the policy for each target process.

The responsibilities of the broker process are: The broker, is in broad terms, a privileged controller/supervisor of the activities of the sandboxed processes. In Chromium, the broker is always the browser process. The sandbox is provided as a static library that must be linked to both the broker and the target executables.

#Sandboxie osx code

Throughout the documentation and the code these two terms are used with that precise connotation. The minimal sandbox configuration has two processes: one that is a privileged controller known as the broker, and one or more sandboxed processes known as the target. Anything that needs to be sandboxed needs to live on a separate process. Sandbox operates at process-level granularity.

#Sandboxie osx windows 7

The sandbox is designed for both 32-bit and 64-bit processes and has been tested on all Windows OS flavors between Windows 7 and Windows 10, both 32-bit and 64-bit. There are no special kernel mode drivers, and the user does not need to be an administrator in order for the sandbox to operate correctly. The Windows sandbox is a user-mode only sandbox. The sandbox should not rely on code emulation, code translation, or patching to provide security.

Emulation is not security: Emulation and virtual machine solutions do not by themselves provide security.This is usually the case if the OS security is used properly. It's ok to have performance penalties for exceptional cases when a sensitive resource needs to be touched once in a controlled manner. In this case the sandbox should impose near-zero performance impact. Be nimble: Non-malicious code does not try to access resources it cannot obtain.In practice, it could happen as soon as the first external input is accepted, or right before the main loop is entered. Assume sandboxed code is malicious code: For threat-modeling purposes, we consider the sandbox compromised (that is, running malicious code) once the execution path reaches past a few early calls in the main() function.In other words, the sandbox should work even if the user cannot elevate to super-user. Principle of least privilege: This should be applied both to the sandboxed code and to the code that controls the sandbox.On the other hand, it is OK to create application-level objects (abstractions) that have a custom security model. Let the operating system apply its security to the objects it controls. Do not re-invent the wheel: It is tempting to extend the OS kernel with a better security model.

A description of what the sandbox does and doesn’t protect against may also be found in the FAQ. If you don‘t feel like reading this whole document you can read the Sandbox FAQ instead. The Linux implementation is described here, the OSX implementation here. This document covers the Windows implementation as well as the general design. The architecture and exact assurances that the sandbox provides are dependent on the operating system. Sandbox leverages the OS-provided security to allow code execution that cannot make persistent changes to the computer or access information that is confidential. The sandbox objective is to provide hard guarantees about what ultimately a piece of code can or cannot do no matter what its inputs are. For a codebase as large and diverse as Chromium, reasoning about the combined behavior of all its parts is nearly impossible. The key to security is understanding: we can only truly secure a system if we fully understand its behaviors with respect to the combination of all possible inputs in all possible states. Security is one of the most important goals for Chromium.